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Abstract—The enactive approach to cognition is typically
proposed as a viable alternative to traditional cognitive science.
Enactive cognition displaces the explanatory focus from the
internal representations of the agent to the direct sensorimotor
interaction with its environment. In this paper, we investigate
enactive learning through means of artificial agent simulations.
We compare the performances of the enactive agent to an agent
operating on classical reinforcement learning in foraging tasks
within maze environments. The characteristics of the agents are
analysed in terms of the accessibility of the environmental states,
goals, and exploration/exploitation tradeoffs. We confirm that
the enactive agent can successfully interact with its environment
and learn to avoid unfavourable interactions using intrinsically
defined goals. The performance of the enactive agent is shown
to be limited by the number of affordable actions.
Index Terms—Enactive Learning, Reinforcement Learning, In-
trinsic Motivation, Self-motivation, Exploration and Exploitation,
Curiosity, Artificial Intelligence, Simulation
I. INTRODUCTION
The enactive paradigm has originally emerged from embod-
ied cognitive science and particularly from the early work of
Maturana and Varela [1], [2]. According to this paradigm, a
living organism depends constitutively on its living body and
places sensorimotor interactions at the centre of cognition [3].
Cognition becomes therefore aligned with the organisational
principles of living organisms while giving a major role to the
phenomenology of experience. The paradigm challenges the
separation between the internal constituents of a system and its
external conditions, and emphasises the interaction between the
two. It also perceives an organism as an autonomous and active
entity that is able to adaptively maintain itself in its environment
[4]. For this type of interactions to happen enactivism posits
that the agent must be a part of reality [5], [6].
The paradigm has influenced a large number of embodied
cognition theorists [7], [8] and has contributed to the emergence
of a variety of research programs such as evolutionary [9] and
epigenetic [10] robotics. In the area of Artificial Intelligence
(AI), it is becoming more and more accepted as a viable
alternative to the computationalist approaches in building
artificial agents that can behave in a flexible and robust manner
under dynamic conditions [11]. Nevertheless, some concerns
have been raised with regard to the sufficiency of the current
enactive AI for advancing our understanding of artificial agency
and providing accurate models of cognition [12], [13]. The
aim of this paper is to provide some initial steps towards
the development of such an understanding. We think that
enactive cognitive science can provide the conceptual tools
that are needed to diagnose more clearly the limitations of
current enactive AI, particularly at a time where Reinforcement
Learning (RL) is by far the dominant paradigm [14]–[16].
The development of an enactive AI would provide fuller
models of Enactive Learning (EL) and would challenge the
RL methodologies that fail at many real-world problems.
There were few attempts to operationalise enactive cognition
in the context of autonomous agents and agent learning. For
instance, the authors in [17] use the enactive principles to
model biological agents. Such agents try to perform rewarding
interactions with their environment instead of trying to reach
rewarding states as it is the case with RL. In another work,
[18] formalise the enactive types of interactions between the
agent and its environment using an enactive redefinition of
Markov Decision Processes. The framework describes a viable
architecture that could be used in designing enactive agents but
does not evaluate the paradigm in the face of environmental
complexity nor it compares it to RL. Departing from the
same theoretical framework, we propose to scrutinise enactive
learning by building an artificial agent that could act based on
enactive principles. We compare such agent to a classical RL
agent within complex and volatile maze environments. We then
analyse and discuss the different behavioural characteristics
of both agents in light of limited access to the environmental
states, goals, and exploration/exploitation tradeoffs. We show
that enactive the agent can successfully learn to interact
with its environment and exploit regularities of sensorimotor
interactions. Particularly, it learns to avoid unfavourable actions
using intrinsically defined goals.
The paper is structured as following. In section 2, we provide
the theoretic foundation of enactive cognition. In section 3, we
give the formal agent models as well as the process of enactive
learning. In section 4, we provide the methodology and the
experimental setting. In section 5, we provide the results and
discussion. Finally, we conclude and highlight the future work.
II. ENACTIVE COGNITION
Enactive cognition is fundamentally compliant with the
constructivist school of thought, which perceives learning as
creating meaning from experience [19]. On the contrary of
cognitive psychologists who think of the mind as a reference
tool to the real world, constructivists view the mind as filtering
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input from the world to produce its own unique reality [20].
The key concepts behind the enactive paradigm is that the
agent must discover and learn to exploit the regularities in
its interactions with the environment [18]. Regularities are
patterns of sensorimotor interactions that occur consistently
and depend on the active interactions between the agent and
its environment.
To better understand how an enactive agent operates, let us
contrast it with the type of agent that are often used in RL and
rely heavily on internal representations of their environment.
Such agent (namely RL agent), passively interprets input data
as if it represented the environment. For instance, we could
take the situation of a robot exploring a real-world environment.
The position of the robot reflects its (spatial) state as seen by
an external observer, and its internal state as if the robot is
keeping track of its own position. The state of the environment
is also available to the robot and would for instance account for
the percepts that are available within its visual field. Moving
around implies a change in the perceptual field and therefore
the state of the environment. Such assumptions do not hold for
the enactive agent which is not a passive observer of reality
but constructs its perception of the environment through the
active experience of interaction [21], [22]. In this case, the
states of the environment are not directly available and the
agent is actively involved in shaping its perceptions of those
states. We illustrate the distinctions between the two types of
agents in figure 1. We particularly look at how interactions are
initiated between the agent and the environment as a succession
of decision cycles.
(a) Reinforcement Learning (b) Enactive Learning
Fig. 1. Interactions between the agent and the environment in reinforcement
and enactive learnings.
In figure 1(a), the interaction cycle starts with an observation
ot and ends with an action at on the environment. In figure 1(b),
the cycle starts with the agent performing an experiment et
and ends by the agent receiving the result rt of the experiment.
Let us now look at the cycles of figure 1(b). At the beginning
of each decision cycle t of the enactive interactions, the agent
decides on an intended sensorimotor interaction to try to enact
with reference to the reactive part played by the environment.
That is, the agent enacts an interaction it = 〈et, rt〉 at time t,
with it being an element of the set of primitive interactions I .
Enacting it means experimenting et and receiving a result rt.
Then, the agent records the two-step sequence 〈it−1, it〉 made
by the previously enacted interaction it−1 of it. The sequence
of interactions 〈it−1, it〉 is called a composite interaction. The
interaction it−1 is called 〈it−1, it〉’s pre-interaction, noted as
pre(〈it−1, it〉), and it is called 〈it−1, it〉’s post-interaction and
is noted as post(〈it−1, it〉). The set of composite interactions
known by the agent at time t is defined as Kt and the set
Jt = I ∪Kt is the set of all interactions known to the agent
at time t. When enacted, the primitive interaction it activates
previously learned composite interactions as it matches their
pre-interaction. For example, if it = a and if the composite
interaction 〈a, b〉 has been learned before time t, then the
composite interaction 〈a, b〉 is activated, which means that
it is recalled from memory. Activated composite interactions
propose their post-interaction’s experiment, in this case: b’s
experiment. If the sequence 〈a, b〉 corresponds to a regularity
of interaction, then it is probable that the sequence 〈a, b〉
can be enacted again. Therefore, the agent can anticipate that
performing b’s experiment will likely produce b’s result. The
agent can thus base its choice of the next experiment on this
anticipation.
III. AGENT LEARNING MODELS
In the following, we provide the details of the enactive and
reinforcement learning models.
A. Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement Learning was inspired by behaviourist psy-
chology as it uses feedback (reinforcement) to modify be-
haviours in the desired direction [19]. In practice, an agent is
built as to take actions in an environment while maximising
some cumulative reward. This is usually formalised using a
Markov Decision Process (MDP) within a fully described
environment. The MDP is generally represented as a tuple
〈S,A,R, T 〉 where S and A are the state and action spaces
defined on the environment. The function R : S ×A×S → R
is a reward function that determines how much an agent will
be rewarded by taking a given action in a given state. The
agent has partial control on the outcomes in its model, which
is described by the transition probability function (1),
T (s, a, s′) = P(st+1 = s′|st = s, at = a) (1)
with s, s′ ∈ S and a ∈ A. The goal of the agent is to find a
policy pi : S → A that maximises the discounted summation
of rewards. When the utility of each state converges, we get
the optimal policy pi∗. The optimal policy is found by iterating
using the value function V pi described in (2),
V pi(s) =
∑
s′∈S
T (s, pi(s), s′)
[
R(s, pi(s), s′) + γV pi(s′)
]
(2)
with γ being a discounting factor in [0, 1]. The optimal
behaviour of the agent is to select an action at each state
according to pi∗. An optimal behaviour would be a sequence
of actions yielding a sequence of occupied states.
In the following, we choose to restrict certain features of RL
in order to allow for fair comparison with the enactive learning.
For S = R2, we limit the number of states that are available
to the agent by defining its scope as distance δ ∈ R. The new
state space becomes Sδ = {s′ ∈ R2 : ‖s − s′‖ ≤ δ} with
state s being the location of the agent. We also parametrise
the exploratory and exploitative behaviours of the agent by a
parameter α ∈ [0, 1]. α is the probability of using a purely
exploratory strategy (random walk) while 1−α is the probability
of following the optimal policy pi∗.
B. Enactive Learning
1) Enactive MDP: The main distinction between RL and the
EL resides in the nature of the interactions between the agent
and its environment. Such interactions are based on the unique
element of actions and results. We can model such interactions
using an Enactive Markov Decision Process (EMDP) as shown
in figure 2. An EMDP [17] is defined as a tuple 〈S, I, q, p〉 with
S being the set of environment states; I the set of primitive
interactions offered by the coupling between the agent and the
environment; q a probability distribution such that q(st+1|st, it)
gives the probability that the environment transitions to state
st+1 ∈ S when the agent chooses interaction it ∈ I in state
st ∈ S; and p is a probability distribution such that p(et|st, it)
gives the probability that the agent receives input et ∈ I after
choosing it in state st.
Fig. 2. Enactive Markov Decision Process
In the EMDP, it is called the intended interaction as it
represents the sensorimotor scheme that the agent intends to
enact at the beginning of step t; and constitutes the agent’s
output that is sent to the environment. We call et the enacted
interaction because it represents the sensorimotor scheme that
the agent records as actually enacted at the end of step t; et
constitutes the agent’s input received from the environment. If
the enacted interaction equals the intended interaction (et = it)
then the attempted enaction of it is considered a success,
otherwise, it is considered a failure.
2) The Learning Process: The mechanism underlying the
EMDP could be implemented as a sequential learning process
that relies on the interactions between the agent and its
environment [17]. The enactive learning process operates at
every decision step t according to the following 7 phases.
1) Preparation: The agent is initially presented with a set
of interactions Ct ⊂ Jt referred to as the context, with
C0 = ∅ and J0 = I .
2) Activation: The agent takes the previously learned
composite interactions whose pre-interaction belongs
to the current context and activates them, forming the
set At of activated interactions defined as At = {a ∈
Kt|pre(a) ∈ Ct}.
3) Proposition: The activated interactions in At propose
their post-interaction for enaction, forming the set Pt
of proposed interactions defined as Pt = {p ∈ Jt|∃a ∈
At, p = post(a)}.
4) Selection: The intended interaction it is selected from
the proposed interactions in Pt based on the proclivity
of the interactions. The proclivity of an interaction it
is defined as proclivity(it) = r(it)× P(it) and reflects
the regularity of the interaction based on its probability
of occurrence and the motivations of the agent.
The selection of the intended interaction is also subject
to parameters α ∈ [0, 1] and d ∈ R. α is the probability
that it is selected randomly for exploratory purposes,
and 1− α is the probability that it is selected based on
proclivity. The parameter d encodes the limited foresight
of the agent and specifies how deep it can go in the
hierarchy of interactions. In other words, d is the length
of the allowable sequences of interactions.
5) Enaction: The agent tries to enact the intended inter-
action it, which could (or not) result in an enacted
interaction et.
6) Learning: New composite interactions are constructed
or reinforced with their pre-interaction belonging to the
context Ct and their post interaction being et, forming the
set of learned or reinforced interactions Lt to be included
in Kt+1. The set Lt is defined as Lt = {〈pre(i), et〉}.
7) Construction: A new context Ct+1 is constructed to
include the stabilized interactions in et and post(et):
Ct+1 ← Lηt ∪ {et} ∪ {post(et)}.
In the following section, we propose to test the enactive and
reinforced mechanisms within artificial agents.
IV. METHODOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTAL SCENARIO
To evaluate the two paradigms we set up an experimental
scenario in which two agents are expected to perform a foraging
task in a 2D maze environment as illustrated in figure 3. Each
agent is tested on its own and both agents start from the same
position.
Fig. 3. Maze with one agent and 18 food units
A. The environment
The environment is a 8×10 maze and is defined in terms of
its structure and behaviour. The structure of the maze reflects
the difficulty of the problem based on the existence of obstacles
and how they limit the access to the food units. The obstacles
and their distribution are important when we evaluate the
exploratory behaviours of the agents. The dynamic aspects of
the environment reside in uniformly adding 20 food units every
200 ticks for an overall period of 1000 ticks per trial.
B. The agents
An agent is an entity that moves in a 2D space according to a
predefined list of actions: moving forward by one step, turning
right by 90◦, turning left by 90◦. The enactive agents possess
few additional actions that correspond to failures of interactions.
For instance, the action “step” has another action “step fail”
that corresponds to a failed “step” action and happens when
the agent is attempting to move forward despite the existence
of an obstacle. In the following simulations, we consider two
types of agents.
1) An enactive agent that uses EL and interacts with the
environment according to an EMDP.
2) A RL agent that interacts with the observable environ-
ment according to an MDP. The agent uses a Q-Learning
mechanism by updating the reward states based on any
dynamically added food unit.
The rewards of the RL agent are defined as in (3).
r(st) =
 +5 if st = food cell0.04 if st = empty cell−9 if st = obstacle cell (3)
Since the enactive agent does not possess an extrinsically
defined utility function that maps states to rewards [23],
[24], we need to define an intrinsic valuation of its actions.
Intrinsic motivational values are the main driver of the
agent’s spontaneous exploratory behaviour [18], [25], [26].
In particular, we want the rewarding mechanism to account
for the adaptive behavioural strategies of the agent in the face
of constantly changing environments. We define the agent’s
intrinsic motivations using a reward function r : I → R that
maps primitive interactions to motivational states (4).
r(it) =

+10 if it = step
−1 if it = step fails
−0.3 if it = turn right
−0.3 if it = turn left
(4)
The feedback values (4) should in principle be chosen as to
encode the expected behaviour that would lead to the desired
goals. In RL, the goal is extrinsically specified as scalar reward
values. In EL, goal-oriented behaviours are specified as intrinsic
motivational values [17]. For instance, the step action has a
fixed positive valence that does not change over time, which
means that the agent has the same level of motivation to walk
forward. Similarly, turning right and left have low negative
valences, which means that the agent would often avoid turning.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. The Enactive Learning
Quantifying the enactive learning requires at first an evalua-
tion of the agents ability to avoid negative-valence enactions.
The valence Vt is the value that the agent assigns to an
interaction it, based on its intrinsic motivational value and
its probability of occurrence. The enactive learning translates
to learning to choose interactions that have positive valence
and avoid the interactions that have negative valence.
Figure 4 shows the reduction in negative valence counts
for 15 runs of the EL agent with δ = 10 and α = 0. We
started by dividing the 1000-tick period into 10 time windows
of length ∆t = 100 each. Then, we calculated the means of
all the standard deviations across the 15 trials of each time
window. The reduction of variance reflects a stabilisation in
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Fig. 4. Reduction in negative valence
the negative counts, and that actions with negative valence
are becoming less and less frequent as time goes on. This
also means that the agent has mastered the enactions and their
consequences, and in our case, learnt to avoid bumping into the
wall while maintaining the combinations of actions (turning
left/right) that do have negative valence but are required to
explore the environment. Such balance reflects the trade off
between exploitation and exploration in the sense that the agent
learns to maximise valences.
B. Comparing the learning paradigms
In the following, we compare the foraging performances
of the agents for exploratory behaviours α ∈ {0, 0.5} across
foresights d ∈ [2, 20] and δ ∈ [21, 211].
Since the notion of space is not explicitly defined for EL, we
need to interpret how d and δ map to each other. For RL, an
increment in δ corresponds to an increment in space coverage,
for instance, moving from position x to position y happens
with ‖x − y‖ ≤ δ. Limiting the choice of interactions with
motivational values (4), makes the EL agent more likely to
pick the “step” interaction instead of the others. The interaction
“step” corresponds in reality to a change in space. Therefore,
an increment in d corresponds to an increment in the space
coverage. For instance, let us take the composite interaction
〈it, 〈it+1, it+2〉〉 composed of successful “step” actions: et =
et+1 = et+2 = “step” and rt = rt+1 = rt+2 = “Success”.
This sequence causes the agent to change position from st to
st+3 with ‖st−st+3‖ = 3. This type of mapping illustrates how
internal motivational models map to behaviours. Programming
the enactive agent corresponds to finding the right motivational
model that would reproduce the desired behaviours.
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Fig. 5. Foraging for different exploratory strategies
The performances of the agents are shown in figure 5. In
figure 5(a), the RL agent exhibits a systematic, deterministic
behaviour for α = 0 since it is solely governed by its policy.
Adding and explorative behaviour (α = 0.5) improves the
gain when the foresight is limited (scope [2-10]) but goes up
for δ = 10, which means that the scope covers most of the
8× 20 maze. When the scope covers all the space (δ ' 20),
the agent’s gain is mainly driven by exploitation.
Despite the poor overall performance shown in figure 5(b),
the EL agent did actually start well for δ = 2 with a
performance within [50,60] compared to that of the RL agent
(20), but then its performance went down with the increase
of d. The drop of performance of α = 0 for high d values is
mainly due to the usage of long sequences of sensorimotor
interactions, which take long to enact, evaluate and learn.
Complex enactions impair the agents ability to exploit the space
and traps him in suboptimal areas. This is true in our case
even with 4 primitive interactions and should grow intractably
if we add more interactions. A possible solution to reduce this
complexity is to interrupt the activation cycle of long sequences
of interactions by randomly picking one primitive interaction
instead. The use of such an exploratory behaviour is visible
for α = 0.5 and yields more gain.
Being trapped in complex interactions does not necessarily
translate to a goal-oriented behaviour for an external observer
but accounts for the spontaneity and the self-motivation
that drives the EL agent [27]. The goal-driven behaviour
becomes an emergent property of the constructs (4). The
challenge is therefore to find the appropriate mapping from
rewards (3) to motivational values (4) while balancing the
exploration/exploitation tradeoff with an optimal α.
Enactive learning could fail at problems that cannot be
defined in terms of states either for the lack of any formal
description of the state space or when the state space is too
large to be encoded in a reward function. While reinforcement
learning is more performant when the state space is well defined,
it still lacks the ability to maintain its scalability for large
spaces. Enactive learning on the other hand has the ability to
construct its own map of the state-space and exploit it based
on its intrinsic model of behaviour. We summarise the main
difference between the two learning paradigms in table I.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Enactive Learning is an interesting alternative to RL given its
capability to operate without prior knowledge of the states of the
environment. We developed an artificial agent that learns based
on the enactive principles, and compared its behaviours and
performances to an agent that runs on RL. The agents are tested
in foraging tasks within complex and volatile environments.
We show that the enactive agent can successfully interact with
its environment, and learn to avoid unfavourable interactions
using intrinsically defined goals. The enactive agent is shown
to be limited by the number of affordable actions that it could
enact at a time. Limiting the size of its memory of interactions
or relying on exploratory strategies increases its performance.
As future directions, we would like to change the way we
defined the intrinsic motivational values as scalar values, and
instead use expectations of rewards as it is done in the predictive
coding framework of [28]. Moreover, we think of investigating
the structures of hierarchies of interactions and whether they
could be used to build spatial representations of the environment
and of the agent itself.
TABLE I
COMPARING ENACTIVE AND REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
Criteria Enactive Learning Reinforcement Learning
Theoretical framework Constructivism Behaviourism
Formal model Enactive MDP (EMDP) MDP
Mechanism Sequential Learning Value Iteration
Reward Intrinsic, not a function of the environment (self-motivation) Extrinsic, function of environment
Scope Depth in hierarchies of interactions Distance on the state space
Goal Emergent, mainly driven by self-motivation Predefined, using a reward function
Representation Gradient of actions Hierarchies of interactions
Perception Percepts are internally constructed Percepts are function of the environment
Input/Output Result/Experiment Observation/Action
Action cycle Starts from the agent Starts from the environment
REFERENCES
[1] F. J. Valera, E. Thompson, and E. Rosch, “The embodied mind: Cognitive
science and human experience,” 1991.
[2] H. R. Maturana and F. J. Varela, Autopoiesis and cognition: The
realization of the living. Springer Science & Business Media, 1991,
vol. 42.
[3] O. L. Georgeon and D. Aha, “The radical interactionism conceptual
commitment,” Journal of Artificial General Intelligence, vol. 4, no. 2,
pp. 31–36, 2013.
[4] E. Abramova, M. Slors, and I. van Rooij, “Enactive mechanistic
explanation of social cognition,” in Proceedings of the 39th Annual
Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 2017, pp. 26–29.
[5] S. Gallagher and M. Bower, “Making enactivism even more embodied,”
2013.
[6] X. E. Barandiaran, “Autonomy and enactivism: towards a theory of
sensorimotor autonomous agency,” Topoi, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 409–430,
2017.
[7] A. Clark, Being there, 1997.
[8] D. D. Hutto and E. Myin, Radicalizing enactivism: Basic minds without
content, 2012.
[9] I. Harvey, E. D. Paolo, R. Wood, M. Quinn, and E. Tuci, “Evolutionary
robotics: A new scientific tool for studying cognition,” Artificial life,
vol. 11, no. 1-2, pp. 79–98, 2005.
[10] L. Berthouze and T. Ziemke, “Epigenetic roboticsmodelling cognitive
development in robotic systems,” 2003.
[11] E. Di Paolo and E. Thompson, “The enactive approach,” 2014.
[12] T. Froese and T. Ziemke, “Enactive artificial intelligence: Investigating
the systemic organization of life and mind,” Artificial Intelligence, vol.
173, no. 3-4, pp. 466–500, 2009.
[13] S. Torrance and T. Froese, “An inter-enactive approach to agency:
Participatory sense-making, dynamics, and sociality,” Agency, p. 21.
[14] S. J. Russell and P. Norvig, Artificial intelligence: a modern approach.
Malaysia; Pearson Education Limited,, 2016.
[15] D. Silver, A. Huang, C. J. Maddison, A. Guez, L. Sifre, G. Van
Den Driessche, J. Schrittwieser, I. Antonoglou, V. Panneershelvam,
M. Lanctot et al., “Mastering the game of go with deep neural networks
and tree search,” nature, vol. 529, no. 7587, pp. 484–489, 2016.
[16] V. Mnih, K. Kavukcuoglu, D. Silver, A. A. Rusu, J. Veness, M. G.
Bellemare, A. Graves, M. Riedmiller, A. K. Fidjeland, G. Ostrovski et al.,
“Human-level control through deep reinforcement learning,” Nature, vol.
518, no. 7540, p. 529, 2015.
[17] O. L. Georgeon, R. C. Casado, and L. A. Matignon, “Modeling biological
agents beyond the reinforcement-learning paradigm,” Procedia Computer
Science, vol. 71, pp. 17–22, 2015.
[18] O. L. Georgeon, C. Wolf, and S. Gay, “An enactive approach to
autonomous agent and robot learning,” in Development and Learning
and Epigenetic Robotics (ICDL), 2013 IEEE Third Joint International
Conference on. IEEE, 2013, pp. 1–6.
[19] P. A. Ertmer and T. J. Newby, “Behaviorism, cognitivism, constructivism:
Comparing critical features from an instructional design perspective,”
Performance Improvement Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 43–71, 2013.
[20] D. H. Jonassen, “Evaluating constructivistic learning,” Educational
technology, vol. 31, no. 9, pp. 28–33, 1991.
[21] O. L. Georgeon, “Little ai: Playing a constructivist robot,” SoftwareX,
vol. 6, pp. 161–164, 2017.
[22] O. L. Georgeon, F. J. Bernard, and A. Cordier, “Constructing phenomenal
knowledge in an unknown noumenal reality,” Procedia Computer Science,
vol. 71, pp. 11–16, 2015.
[23] R. S. Sutton, D. Precup, and S. Singh, “Between mdps and semi-mdps: A
framework for temporal abstraction in reinforcement learning,” Artificial
intelligence, vol. 112, no. 1-2, pp. 181–211, 1999.
[24] A. G. Barto, S. Singh, and N. Chentanez, “Intrinsically motivated learning
of hierarchical collections of skills.” Citeseer.
[25] P.-Y. Oudeyer and F. Kaplan, “What is intrinsic motivation? a typology
of computational approaches,” Frontiers in neurorobotics, vol. 1, p. 6,
2009.
[26] ——, “How can we define intrinsic motivation?” in Proceedings of
the 8th International Conference on Epigenetic Robotics: Modeling
Cognitive Development in Robotic Systems, Lund University Cognitive
Studies, Lund: LUCS, Brighton. Lund University Cognitive Studies,
Lund: LUCS, Brighton, 2008.
[27] S. Gay, A. Mille, and A. Cordier, “Autonomous object modeling
and exploiting: a new approach based on affordances from continual
interaction with environment,” in The Seventh Joint IEEE International
Conference on Developmental Learning and Epigenetic Robotics (ICDL-
Epirob), 2017.
[28] K. Friston, F. Rigoli, D. Ognibene, C. Mathys, T. Fitzgerald, and
G. Pezzulo, “Discussion paper active inference and epistemic value,”
2015.
